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Goethe’s Conscience
❦
Fritz Breithaupt1
For Rainer Nägele
Any student or reader of the works by Rainer Nägele knows his 
insistence on what he calls surface reading. Those who have had the 
privilege of sitting in his classes will also know his reactions to meta-
phors of depth, hidden meanings, and truths to be uncovered: They 
do not belong to the practice of reading. Reading is to discover the 
textual connections that are out in the open and on the surface; it is 
about the “carpet of truth,” as one of his essays famously ends,2 and 
about a “reading of correspondences.”3
The following reading is inspired by Rainer Nägele’s work. I would 
like to suggest how conscience, or in German das Gewissen, can be 
found as operating on the surface rather than as a deep interior 
faculty. Conscience might not be governed by deep-seated feelings 
of right and wrong, but might instead be structured at least partly by 
almost mechanical linguistic maneuvers and associations. With the 
help of Rainer Nägele, this is what my reading of Goethe will allow us 
to consider. Structuring this reading of conscience and of conscience 
in Goethe, especially in Faust, are the subsequent arguments:
1My gratitude goes to Andrew Hamilton and Andrea Meyertholen for partly edit-
ing and partly translating this text and for Jason Groves for his encouraging critique.
2Rainer Nägele, „Benjamin’s Ground,“ in: Rainer Nägele, Ed., Benjamin’s Ground. New 
Readings of Walter Benjamin, Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1988, 19–38: 37.
3Rainer Nägele, Echoes of Translation. Reading Between Texts, Baltimore, London: Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1997: 10.
550 Fritz Breithaupt
1.  Conscience is not a “deep” or “interiorized” faculty of the mind con-
cerned with good and evil. Rather, it comes about if someone fails to 
have a response. Bad conscience results if one cannot or does not want 
to rebuff an accusation with a response, be it even a bad excuse. Hence, 
it is one’s task to develop mechanisms of replying to accusations to 
defend oneself and immunize oneself against attacks.
2.  Nevertheless, one cannot or should not shield oneself entirely and has 
to remain available. Otherwise, one would become limited to mere 
presence and unreachable by the demands of others. 
The following notes are brief and go only a few steps in the direction 
of these arguments. My hope is that readers will be able to use this 
sketch as a starting point for their own thoughts.
Conscience
Contemporary discussions of morality usually focus on moral judg-
ment.4 The implicit idea about morality is the assumed presence of 
a third-person observer who observes, evaluates, and judges human 
behavior, including one’s own, like a script with interchangeable 
players. This focus on moral judgment may be in line with legal 
considerations, but it does not explain the development of moral 
faculties. Moral development is more likely to begin with a key expe-
rience, a first-person experience. Specifically, contemporary theorists 
often locate the beginning of moral development in the experience 
of being a victim. For example, the Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen 
begins his account of morality by quoting Dickens: “there is nothing 
so finely perceived and finely felt, as injustice.”5
Following Goethe (and Rainer Nägele’s readings of Goethe), I will 
suggest, however, that a primal scene of morality is actually that of 
being an agent and perpetrator. It is bad conscience that forces us, 
through its nagging insistence, to confront our actions. In the case of 
bad conscience, the experience is shaped by Nachträglichkeit (belated-
ness); that is to say, it comes about later and in a way structured by 
codifications of language that mark an event as morally “bad.” The 
4Of course, this is a tradition that goes back to Kant. For an influential contemporary 
approach, see Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind. Why Good People Are Divided by Politics 
and Religion, New York: Pantheon, 2012.
5Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 2009, vii.
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“first” experience is already a later reflection. We may not have a bad 
conscience because we did something wrong, but because someone, 
perhaps an inner voice, accuses us afterwards that we did something 
wrong. As opposed to a simple delay in time, Nachträglichkeit involves, 
as Rainer Nägele puts it, a “rupture of continuity” and a shift to the 
domain of language.6
What is bad conscience and how does it come about?
It helps to look at certain contemporary notions of conscience, the 
most prominent of which are probably the ones deriving from Jean 
Piaget’s famous model of the formation of conscience. Lawrence 
Kohlberg, building on Piaget’s suggestion, has divided the stages of 
moral development (conscience) into three types: pre-conventional 
(avoiding punishment), conventional (following norms) and post-
conventional (comparing norms).7 The idea is that we all learn moral 
action by means of a step-by-step “interiorization” of norms, beginning 
with the first phase of simply acting in order to avoid punishment. 
Bad conscience emerges when we act against the interiorized norms. 
It is not too difficult to discern an interesting blending of this new 
conscience with a certain idea of the “unconscious:” According to the 
Piaget-Kohlberg model, the moral norms of conscience sink deep into 
some space that is hidden from awareness. Here the Piaget-Kohlberg 
model aligns with the quite problematic tradition involving modernist 
metaphors of interiorization, depth, and psychology in the twentieth 
century.
As it pertains to conscience, the Piaget-Kohlberg model implies 
that we should be able to assume that everyone who has interiorized 
certain norms shares a moral platform of moral decision-making. By 
this logic we must conclude that criminals and other wrongdoers are 
either mentally disabled (and lack conscience) or are haunted by a 
bad conscience.
This, I believe, is a false conclusion. Mentally sound people can be 
free of bad conscience even if they have committed a crime. Instead, 
I would suggest that conscience operates more like the site of rhe-
torical speeches of accusation and defense, as some older notions of 
conscience proposed. While I do not have sufficient space and time 
6On Nachträglichkeit, see Rainer Nägele, „Beyond Psychology: Freud, Benjamin,  and 
the Articulation of Modernity,“ in: Rainer Nägele, Theater, Theory, Speculation: Walter 
Benjamin and the Scenes of Modernity, Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1991, 
54–77: 76. Also: Rainer Nägele, Reading After Freud: Essays on Goethe, Hölderlin, Habermas, 
Nietzsche, Brecht, Celan, and Freud, New York: Columbia UP, 1987.
7See Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea 
of Justice (Essays on Moral Development), New York: Harper & Row, 1981, Vol. 1.
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here to revisit the rich intellectual history of conscience prior to the 
invention of the unconscious in the late eighteenth century, it should 
be noted that many thinkers imagined conscience to be out in the 
open, as a mental drama in one’s awareness.8
If this is correct, bad conscience would emerge if one lacks a proper 
response to allegations. What I refer to as a proper response goes 
beyond the justification to include any speech that provides an excuse 
if someone is willing to believe in it. To omit this rhetorical dimension 
of the accusation and thereby the dialogical possibilities of a response 
would reduce (or change) conscience to a mere moral measure of 
good and bad behavior (synderesis as Thomas Aquinas had it).
These thoughts suggest, in all their brevity, that conscience may not 
be well described by means of unconscious norms, but rather by the 
model of the older eighteenth-century conscience, prior to its contact 
with the newly codified unconscious, understood as a deep interior 
faculty of the mind. According to the earlier models, conscience is 
not a naturalized, deeper sense of norms, but instead a collection 
of rhetorical replies. Bad conscience emerges once we are forced to 
“hold on” to an accusation—or have decided to do so—and do not 
voice a response or excuse to brush it off.
To summarize: The suggestion is that “conscience” has a narrative-
dialogical-linguistic form.9 Such a dialogical form is indicated in the 
term “responsibility:” When accused of a crime or moral shortcoming, 
we are obligated to “respond.”10 In terms of conscience, this means that 
we have a “bad conscience” when we do not have a proper “response.” 
Certainly, we can choose from many types of “adequate” responses 
which could serve to deflect or parry the accusation in our mind, such 
as in a fencing match. Such response tactics might include:
–  a rhetoric of honesty (confession): One does not need to have a bad 
conscience, or has less of it, when one is honest and confesses;
–  a rhetoric of forgiveness (plea): One does not need to have a bad con-
science, or has less of it, when one begs for forgiveness;
8For a first orientation see Hans Reiner, “Gewissen,” in: Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Philosophie, edited by Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer, and Gottfried Gabriel, Basel 
and Stuttgart: Scheidegger & Spiess, 1974, Vol. 2, 574–592; Josef Bordat, Das Gewissen, 
Bonn: Lepanto, 2012; and more specifically about seventeenth-century casuistic: Al-
bert R. Jonsen & Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry. A History of Moral Reasoning, 
Berkeley: California UP, 1988.
9For a less sketchy account, see Fritz Breithaupt, Kultur der Ausrede, Frankfurt: Suhr-
kamp, 2012.
10For a general theory of “Antwortlichkeit,” see Bernhard Waldenfels, Antwortregister, 
Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2007.
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–  a rhetoric of excuse: One does not need to have a bad conscience, or 
has less of it, when one finds a context in which one’s actions might be 
justified;
–  a rhetoric of distraction: One does not need to have a bad conscience, or 
has less of it, when one can find a distraction and point to other events, 
perhaps other morally relevant behavior, and then neglect the “inner 
voice” of conscience.
Conscience itself would operate as the “inner voice” of prosecution 
as many writers throughout the ages have described it. However, this 
voice is not a voice of depth or an interior unconscious. It is a voice, 
I suggest, that is much more the effect of unanswered attack. It has 
the appearance of depth only because it has no proper place and 
escaped the rhetoric of the reply. 
Goethe’s Iphigenie auf Tauris
Goethe introduces the issue of morality in his writings through a similar 
analogy: Morality comes as an attack against which one has to defend 
oneself. Goethe’s question is how one can avoid a bad conscience, 
one initiated by the allegations and demands of others. 
Generally speaking, Goethe is not typically regarded as a moral 
thinker or practitioner. His ‘wild marriage’ to Christiane Vulpius 
scandalized his contemporaries, as did his revealing poetry, and his 
idiosyncratic attitude towards religion seems to rule out much respect 
for morality on his part. Even within literary studies in the last fifty 
years, the question of conscience and morality in Goethe has only been 
consistently addressed in terms of Iphigenie auf Tauris, most prominently 
by Adorno.11 In the case of Faust, the attractive representation of evil 
gets more consideration than actual questions of morality. But this 
misses two things. The first is that Goethe pursued and rewrote the 
structure of conscience developed in Iphigenie auf Tauris throughout his 
later work. The second is that Goethe’s invention of Mephistopheles as 
a radical reinterpretation of the “inner voice” may have had a greater 
effect on the cultural forms of conscience than the various philosophi-
11Theodor W. Adorno, “Zum Klassizismus von Goethes Iphigenie”, in: Theodor W. 
Adorno, Noten zur Literatur, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981, 495–514; some recent works 
include: Thomas Berger, Der Humanitätsgedanke in der Literatur der deutschen Spätaufklärung 
Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 2008; Horst Lange, “Isaac, Iphigeneia, Christ: Human Sacrifice 
and the Semiotics of the Divine”, in: Publications of the English Goethe Society 78:3 (2009), 
166–88; and Michael Mandelartz, “Die reine Seele und die Politik: Partikularität und 
Universalität in Goethes Iphigenie”, in: Goethe Yearbook 16 (2009): 17–68.
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cal constructions of ethics in the nineteenth century. Although this 
essay is concerned with both threads, the emphasis of our reading will 
concern Faust. First, however, a brief discussion of Iphigenie auf Tauris 
is needed to provide orientation and contrast to Faust.
In Goethe’s most classical play, Orestes must defend himself against 
accusations and free himself from bad conscience after killing his 
mother. Bad conscience comes to him in the form of the Erinyes (Erin-
nyen). These Erinyes reach him via chains of associations: Whenever 
Orestes is reminded somehow of his murderous act, the Erinyes appear. 
Den Flüchtigen verfolgt ihr schneller Fuß;
Sie geben nur um neu zu schrecken Rast12
When his long-lost sister asks him about his family heritage, his fate 
is recalled and Orestes suspects that the unknown woman in front 
of him is one of the Erinyes. Wherever Orestes goes, the Erinyes 
appear, coming on the heels of his memories. These memories expand 
metonymically by association. In the earlier versions of the play, the 
Erinyes were called “Erinnen,” evoking the German word for memory 
(Erinnern).
Once the Erinyes have been recalled, they darken his perception to 
such a degree that he falls into an abyss and cannot distinguish between 
present and absent figures, between the past and present. Haunted by 
the calls of the Erinyes, conscience, Orestes mistakes his friends for 
them and falls prey to madness. The Erinyes issue no accusation and 
invite no defense; rather, as shadows, they are the very punishment 
he receives. His friends, as well as Iphigenie, lament:
O nehmt den Wahn ihm von dem starren Auge,
Daß uns der Augenblick ...nicht...elend mache. (1215–17)13
Returning to the question of conscience, this means that conscience 
dissolves the present moment and removes a person (Orestes) into 
his own past, to the point that it becomes unclear what is present and 
what is past. The memories, i.e. the Erinyes, the forms of conscience, 
are simulacra that make it impossible for Orestes to distinguish past 
from present. His deed lives on in the Erinyes as madness and only 
as madness. Orestes’ punishment for his matricide is precisely this 
obfuscation of the present which in turn begets his blindness before 
his own sister.
12Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Iphigenie auf Tauris, in: Sämtliche Werke. Frankfurter 
Ausgabe (FA), Frankfurt: Klassiker Verlag, 1984–, Vol. I. 5, Vers 1069–70.
13Goethe, Iphigenie, Vers 1215–17.
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The similarity in form and content to the definition of trauma is 
clear: Trauma is a failure of the memory function which cannot prop-
erly catalogue a past event as past. As a result, the past event persists 
in the present in the form of flashbacks, dreams, and hallucinations, 
or for Orestes, as manifested in the shadowy Erinyes. The Erinyes 
as substitutes for conscience are not seeking satisfaction for a crime 
committed; they are themselves the punishment.
Goethe’s cure for this persevering past is light. Light is the pres-
ent, a presence into which the past and its memories disappear. In 
the light of the moment (Augenblick) only that persists which has a 
future. Light is presented as a power emanating forth from the subject 
and reflected in the objects at hand. Goethe takes this description of 
sight from Plotinus, who believed that the eyes felt out the world by 
emitting rays like the sun. Light only brings forth a reflection from 
things that are actually there. As a manifestation of light and sun, 
Orestes can recognize himself and his sister and thus reclaim his feel-
ing for the present.14 Either the simulacra-shadows turn into images 
of something present, or they dissolve into nothing, as the Erinyes 
do. This means they become either truly part of the present, or are 
simply cast off as memories.
To follow this line of thinking then, the challenge at hand is less 
a matter of relegating the past into the past (as twentieth-century 
trauma theory seeks to do), than of recognizing the present for what 
it is. Here we might be reminded of Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, whose 
insistence on presence is foreshadowed in Goethe’s play.15 In Iphigenie 
(acts 1–3), we find no moral engagement with questions of guilt and 
no regret oriented at the past, but rather a rediscovery of the present 
in the person of the sister. Instead of the psychoanalytical process of 
working through the past, part of the solution is simply to forget it. 
Of course, Orestes might have been able to sidestep charges of guilt 
because his action was emotionally justified and legally not culpable. 
But except for the one just outlined, there is no moral or ethical 
process of coming to terms with the past until later in the play when 
Iphigenie and Thoas take center stage. Conscience takes the form of a 
traumatic guilt, thereby robbing the present of its sole claim to reality.
This short account of the optical-visual conception of conscience in 
Iphigenie auf Tauris is meant to outline the starting point for Goethe’s 
subsequent engagement with conscience. For Goethe and for Orestes 
14See Goethe, Iphigenie, 1317–24. 
15See Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey, 
Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003.
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the connotation of conscience and morality is simply negative: It is best 
to get away from them. In response to the question of how, the play 
offers full presence as the answer. Coming to terms with conscience 
does not require listening to a deep inner truth (and Goethe will also 
rewrite the voice of Hamlet’s father in Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre) or 
responding to the shadow-Erinyes, but rather sending the voices of 
the depth back to the underworld and dissolving the shadows. What 
was thought to be a phenomenon of depth (Erinyes from the Under-
world), dissolves like mere shadows on the surface. 
Faust’s Augen-Blick as critique of conscience
It is in Faust that Goethe makes this form of conscience a central 
issue. The idea I am presenting can be expressed succinctly: Faust 
is a cousin of Orestes.16 But whereas Orestes must be cured from a 
madness of conscience that darkens his present, Faust, on the other 
hand, must remain accessible to the demands of conscience. The Faust 
that Mephistopheles tries to create is a perfected, and by that I mean 
perverted, version of Orestes: His present seals itself off and becomes 
untouchable to material accusations. No Erinyes would dare trouble 
this product of the devil. The complete immunization of conscience 
would be the cult of the moment without any regard for the past. The 
danger faced by the God of the prologue consists of not hearing the 
devil any more—and the greatness of God is to be able to hear the 
devil, as Hegel puts it (perhaps thinking of Goethe’s Faust).17 When 
the present distills itself into an absolute or pure present, a manifestly 
fulfilled moment, it is removed from thoughts of other times, the 
thoughts of other people and what happens to them. In this sense, it is 
evil. The result would be a Faust without conscience, lost to the devil.
In the dialogue between Faust and Mephistopheles, the two show 
how they can parry one another’s thrusts. Whoever has a counterpoint 
or a reply is not plagued by conscience (we would not expect that 
Mephistopheles would be, anyway). The more strongly Faust is taken by 
the possibility that a response can suffice, the more unlikely it becomes 
that any thought of conscience could reach him. Mephistopheles’ task 
is to bind Faust to the present, as the bet is meant to do, and thus 
make him numb to conscience. Mephistopheles is also there to goad 
16Benjamin Bennett has expressed a related idea of the genealogy of Orestes and 
Faust, see Benjamin Bennett, Beyond Theory: Eighteenth-Century German Literature and the 
Poetics of Irony, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993, 203.
17Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, Die Phänomenologie des Geistes, chapter „Gewissen.“ 
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Faust on and thereby to immunize him. Faust’s task meanwhile is to 
remain open to something beyond the present.
The tone between them allows the constant parrying and reversal 
of a charge into a countercharge. Gretchen, on the other hand, 
cannot or does not want to escape the voice of conscience, and so is 
driven into captivity by the voice of the Evil Spirit (böser Geist). It is a 
sign of her moral quality that she hears the voice of conscience and 
does not reply to defend herself. To be more precise: By letting the 
whispering of the Geist stand without a reply, Gretchen raises it to the 
voice of conscience.
Precisely this need to listen to the other is at stake in the wager. 
Goethe famously added this scene, the große Lücke, after a long hiatus 
and thus completed Faust. Faust states that he could never be satisfied 
with an illusion, and could never misinterpret an illusion as reality. 
Werd’ ich beruhigt je mich auf ein Faulbett legen:
So sei es gleich um mich getan!
Kannst du mich schmeichelnd je belügen
Daß ich mir selbst gefallen mag,
Kannst du mich mit Genuß betriegen:
Das sei für mich der letzte Tag! (1692–97)
As a consequence of this claim, he can only offer a bet--specifically 
a pact in the form of an “if-then.”18 The point is not that Faust claims 
that he would recognize any illusion, but rather that he would reject 
any illusion once he had recognized it (instead of trying to expand 
it “mit Genuß,” “with pleasure”).
Werd’ ich zum Augenblicke sagen: 
Verweile doch! Du bist so schön!
Dann magst du mich in Fesseln schlagen …(1699–1701)
The moment, the Augen-Blick addressed here as a “Du,” is at its core 
a moment of sight. It is a shot of a present moment, a self-contained, 
unique presence. Accepting the sight of this moment as the only reality 
would be to recognize it without another Augen-Blick, second viewing, 
or possibility of other realities; without the influence of the past and 
without the approach of a visually-conceived conscience. Should Faust 
accept this singular, insular and unrepeatable moment, then he has 
been the victim of an illusion and is lost to the devil. Mephistopheles 
is not the devil because he is evil, but because he suppresses the other-
18About the articulation of the wager, see Werner Hamacher, “Faust, Geld” in: 
Athenäum: Jahrbuch für Romantik 4 (1994): 131–187: 133–34.
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ness of the moment. The devil resides in this fixation on the present, 
which is raised to the status of an absolute when all other possible 
present moments, including those lived by others, are shut out. Hans 
Ulrich Gumbrecht has described this impoverished, pure presence as 
a presence without latency.19 For Goethe’s Faust this pure presence 
without latency is the incarnation of evil. 
Now the opposite side, namely the one occupied by an open and 
moral self, is not simply some fulfilled selfhood. What does it mean to 
remain approachable as a subject, to be aware in one’s acts of more 
than one reality? In a related context, Rainer Nägele notices the split-
ting effects of conscience already in Egmont:
Die Diskrepanz, ja die Inkommensurabilität zwischen Wirkung, Geschehen 
und dem Ich als denkendem, planendem, handelndem Subjekt zieht sich 
als Grundton durch das Stück. Das Zitat, das Autobiographie und Drama 
verwebt, spricht es aus. Es spricht in dem Moment sich aus, wo die Sorge 
eines andern zur planenden Vorsicht mahnt. Sowohl Egmont wie der 
Goethe der Autobiographie evozieren leidenschaftlich die Macht von etwas 
Anderem da, wo sie als überlegendes und überlegenes Ich zum Handeln 
aufgerufen werden. In einer eigentümlichen Dialektik fühlt Egmont sich 
da von sich entfremdet, findet Fremdes in sich, wo die Sorge eines andern 
ihn drängen möchte, planend und bewußt zu handeln. […] Wenn einmal 
von Egmonts Handeln als Akt des Gewissens die Rede ist, erscheint es unter 
dem Vorbehalt des Scheins und eines Gewissens, das in die nächste Nähe 
zum Dämonischen gleite.20
Remaining aware of more than the sealed off presence, which includes 
being ethical, divides the subject; it splits it and leads it to a place from 
which no splinter of the split self can utter “I.” This splitting leads back 
to the trauma of Orestes who lacks a unified presence. What appears 
to be a dilemma in Egmont and Iphigenie turns out to be hope for 
Faust. Faust bets Mephistopheles that he will not be captured by the 
moment, that his present will always remain open to other possibili-
ties and otherness, in other words, split. His two (or more) souls are 
his hope. This is the possibility that things may turn out to be or turn 
into something else (“the quicksilver”). It is the otherness that extends 
19Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, After 1945: Latency as Origin of the Present, Stanford: Stanford 
UP, 2013. Gumbrecht links this latency to moral demands as well: „For the first time 
[around 1970, F.B.], I began to perceive an atmosphere of latency in my surroundings, 
and I understood that the true challenge for a German like myself, born in the years 
immediately following the war, involved assuming personal responsibility and guilt—
paradoxically, for crimes that happened before I was born“ (175).
20Rainer Nägele, „Ach Ich: Egmonts Wirken-Goethes Schreiben,” in: Goethe Yearbook, 
Volume 11 (2002), 213–227 : 222–3.
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beyond a moment of rest (the “Faulbett”), and it is the otherness of 
phenomena that Goethe places at the center of his morphological 
texts, where every phenomenon is more than it seems to be in any 
isolated moment. This otherness is the splitting plurality of the ego, 
and it is the reality of the other that the voice of conscience reminds 
us of. It is not an otherness of some hidden depth, but of looking to 
the side, seeing what or who is next to you and what is already fully 
visible, but has escaped notice so far. It means seeing the shadows and 
being exposed to the demonic.
In Faust, the phenomenon of the moment is an ethical affair. Faust 
cannot or should not repel the Erinyes-like charges. He cannot simply 
forget Gretchen or simply seal off his present, but must recall both 
during the wild flood of images comprising the Walpurgisnacht. And 
yet, it is exactly this accessibility of memory with its pure presence 
that ends the disconnected, though attractive, hocus pocus of the 
Walpurgisnacht.21
So how does one remain open to more than oneself and the one 
moment, open to ethical demands and to latency? Simply being an 
upright character with good moral intentions is not the answer, accord-
ing to Goethe. No inner and better voice saves Faust by reminding him 
of Gretchen. No accusation confronts him. Rather, it is an association 
that saves him. Like the associations tying Orestes to his past, Faust’s 
associations call back images of Gretchen, and in the process crack 
open possibilities of a different present.
I would like to draw attention to the following scene, which ends 
the Walpurgisnacht and rescues Faust by reminding him of Gretchen 
when, in the midst of the confusion, Faust sees a strange, still sight:
FAUST: Mephisto, siehst du dort
Ein blasses, schönes Kind allein und ferne stehen? [...]
Ich muss bekennen, dass mir deucht,
Dass sie dem guten Gretchen gleicht.
MEPH. Laß das nur stehn! dabei wird’s niemand wohl.
Es ist ein Zauberbild, ist leblos, ein Idol.
Ihm zu begegnen, ist nicht gut;
Vom starren Blick erstarret des Menschen Blut,
Und er wird fast in Stein verkehrt,
Von der Meduse hast du ja gehört.
21We cannot even begin a full ethical appraisal of the Walpurgisnacht here. For an 
introduction, see two opposite assessments: Albrecht Schöne, Götterzeichen, Liebeszauber, 
Satanskult: Neue Einblicke in alte Goethetexte, München: Fink, 1982; and Thomas Zabka, 
“Dialektik des Bösen: Warum es in Goethes ‘Walpurgisnacht’ keinen Satan gibt”, in: 
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift 72 (1998), 201–26.
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FAUST. Fürwahr, es sind die Augen eines Toten [...]
FAUST. Wie sonderbar muß diesen schönen Hals
Ein einzig rotes Schnürchen schmücken,
Nicht breiter als ein Messerrücken! (4183–4205)
To be sure, the scene describes how Faust is reminded of Gretchen, 
but at the same time, this memory does not come in the form one 
would usually associate with conscience. There is no allegation of 
wrongdoing, no cricket whispering advice. Instead, we encounter a 
type of image not usually held in particularly high regard by Goethe: 
an idol (Idol, Zauberbild). What is special about this idol?
Faust’s vision here is called “leblos,” another unusual occurrence 
in Goethe’s vocabulary. More typical is the association of image with 
life, as in the tableaux vivants of the Wahlverwandtschaften. In this novel, 
the living images with Ottilie “live” because they show the light and 
manifold possibilities of future development.22 Living images have a 
future. Still, the “dead image” also appears in the Wahlverwandtschaften, 
for instance in the novella contained within the novel. In this short 
narrative, a young neighbor girl attempts to commit suicide to punish a 
young neighbor boy: “Er sollte ihr totes Bild nicht loswerden, er sollte 
nicht aufhören, sich Vorwürfe zu machen.”23 Here the dead image 
persists, lasts, and cannot be changed. The “dead image” of this “tote 
Bild” is a threat to the present, as suggested by Mephistopheles’ refer-
ence to Medusa, and in close proximity to the Erinyes from Iphigenie 
auf Tauris (where, incidentally, we also find a reference to Medusa).24
In Faust, however, the tote Bild does not scream. Instead, it remains 
quiet and the task of ignoring it is left up to Faust. So why doesn’t 
he? The answer seems to lie in the final lines:
Wie sonderbar muß diesen schönen Hals
Ein einzig rotes Schnürchen schmücken,
Nicht breiter als ein Messerrücken!
In the blink of an eye, Faust moves from necklace to knife and from 
beauty to murder. In fact, by adoring the beauty of the neck, he draws 
a line of association, a line which at first glimpse appears as a string 
of jewelry but then turns out to be the bloody contour of a knife cut. 
Of course, such a line is also the line of text, as wide as the back of a 
knife, which draws its own association (and rhyme) between schmücken 
22See Fritz Breithaupt, Jenseits der Bilder: Goethes Politik der Wahrnehmung, Freiburg: 
Rombach, 2000, ch. 4. Rainer Nägele was one of my mentors when I wrote this book. 
23Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Die Wahlverwandtschaften, part II, chapter 10.
24Goethe, Iphigenie, Vers 1162–63.
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and Messerrücken. This necklace-blood-line is not part of the visible; 
rather it is Faust’s addition to what he sees.
Remaining truthful to the logic of the dead image, which insists on 
and even disallows the transformation into a different (living) future, 
Faust adds only a line of death. He kills the lifeless image, but by doing 
so, also inscribes himself into the image. This chain then becomes the 
trace of a murderous act for which Faust himself becomes the prime 
suspect. This associative type of inscription is certainly not a canonical 
form of remorse. However, it proves to be a way of letting conscience 
in, at least in the sense hinted at before, namely as splitting the subject 
and opening the present to more than one reality. Simultaneously, 
Faust recognizes and mistakes, decorates and kills Gretchen. What we 
see in this scene, then, is Goethe’s version of conscience at work. In 
this version, Faust does not hear an inner voice of morality; he starts 
with what he sees and expands it with visual and literal associations, 
decorates the image, thereby inscribing himself onto its surface.
Faust kills the idol twice: First by calling the image dead (Augen 
eines Toten), then by adding a reason for death (Messerrücken). He uses 
the blood to literally write himself into the image, and can ultimately 
decipher himself in the act. “Know thyself,” the motto of the Tower 
Society in Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, is made possible through this 
interpretative act: the one who works associatively on and with an 
image can recognize his own contribution to it. Images reprimand 
their observers. In this case, the associative act with the red necklace 
opens not only Faust’s playful present at the Walpurgisnacht, but at 
the same time his culpability in the past. The present, including the 
work with the image, opens another dimension and another time. 
(Next time we see Faust, he is enraged at Mephistopheles and himself 
for what he has done to Gretchen.)
Faust and Orestes are cousins in that a visually-represented con-
science approaches them both. But while Orestes’ challenge is in 
the deflection of conscience in order to avoid madness, Faust must 
let it in and face his own guilt. During the great gap in his work on 
Faust, Goethe revises the essentially negative conception of conscience 
presented by the Erinyes, and comes to recognize the “dead image” 
as a cure against the sealed-off moment. 
Contrary to the consistent prejudice against him, Goethe is not 
simply an apologist of the moment. It is in the moment that he finds 
legitimacy in the claims of others as well as the claim of conscience. 
Even the often-celebrated hypostasis of the single moment shows that 
the moment must remain open to other possibilities, to memories, to 
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other people, to latency, and to conscience. The famed aesthetic of the 
moment emerges as an otherness of the moment. Even the pale idol 
during the Walpurgisnacht plays a part in this opening of the moment. 
Taken together, the lesson of Iphigenie and Faust is that the subject is 
caught between two extremes with only a questionable middle ground. 
Scylla and Charybdis appear between the haunted Orestes and the 
numb Faust. The only hope is offered in an expressionless idol with 
the Augen eines Toten, with the “Eyes of a Skull.”
***
To conclude, if my reading holds, Goethe develops a complex form 
of moral thinking. This moral thinking, however, would not be well 
served and is not well described by notions of moral judgment or 
conscience as in the Piaget-Kohlberg model. Instead, it is a morality 
that opens up the moment to more than that one moment, and the 
self to the other. Goethe also offers a way to shift my opening sug-
gestions about conscience. There I perhaps a bit hastily suggested 
that bad conscience emerges if one does not reply. To illustrate the 
primal scene of conscience, I subsequently presented the scene staged 
as a court of law, complete with accusation and defense, allegation 
and excuse. However, the theatricality of this scene may already be 
overstated. What we call conscience may be an effect of letting words 
and images insist and persist.
Nevertheless, as Rainer Nägele reminds us, the rearticulation of 
a conscience-of-depth as a conscience-on-the-surface still involves 
payment. The moral debt (Schuld) rests on an older economic debt 
(Schuld) of having to repay. With Anaximander, he articulates:
[...] Anaximander inscribes Dasein into a context of debt and/or guilt that 
is not yet defined in an ethical sphere but that approaches the prejected 
Dasein as Vorwurf in the sense of an objection and reproach that demand 
some kind of toll. This toll has a wide range of coins and payments from 
the small slips and detours of our tongues and movement to the ultimate 
toll of death [...]25
25Rainer Nägele, „The Eyes of the Skull: Benjamin’s Aesthetics,“ in: Theater, Theory 
Speculation, 135–166: 115–6.
